This paper re-examines the incentives of mutual fund managers arising from investor flows. We provide evidence that the convexity of the flow-performance relationship varies with economic activity. We show that the effect is economically large and is driven neither by abnormal years nor by outliers. We test two possible channels through which this pattern may arise. We investigate implications of the time-varying convexity for the incentives of managers to alter strategically the risk of their portfolios. We provide evidence supporting a 'conditional' tournament hypothesis: poor mid-year performers increase the risk of the portfolio only when economic activity is strong.
INTRODUCTION
The mutual fund industry has grown remarkably over the past two decades. According to the Investment Company Institute 1 , net cash flows into equity mutual funds have increased by a factor of twenty to one between 1985 and 2005, while gross inflows and outflows have both increased by factors larger than thirty to one. Academic research into mutual fund issues has likewise grown considerably over the same period. One topic that has attracted a lot of attention is the sensitivity to fund performance of cash flows from investors. Since the seminal work by Ippolito (1992) , a large and active literature 2 has confirmed the existence of a convex relationship between flows and past performance: investors seem to react strongly to differences in performance among the top performing funds in the industry, but do not react to differences in performance among underperforming funds. This behavior is consistent with rational behavior and competitive equilibrium, as demonstrated by Berk and Green (2004) , and the empirical evidence has been found to be robust across different definitions of flows and performance, and across many different sets of control variables.
The convexity of the flow-performance relationship is important because it shapes the incentives of mutual fund managers. Fees raised by mutual funds, and therefore the compensation of mutual fund managers, are proportional to the average net assets held during the year. As first pointed out by Brown, Harlow and Starks (1996) and by Chevalier and Ellison (1997) , the nature of the fee structure, the convexity of the flow-performance relationship, and the assessment of performance on a calendar year basis, together imply that mutual fund managers with poor mid-year performances have incentives to increase the risk of their portfolio during the second half of the year. By raising risk, managers of underperforming funds would catch up with stronger performers if successful, but have little to lose if not. This prediction has been called the tournament hypothesis.
The tournament hypothesis has prompted much empirical and methodological debate over the past fifteen years, and the evidence is mixed. Chevalier and Ellison (1997) and Koski and Pontiff (1999) initially provided evidence generally supportive of the tournament hypothesis. In contrast, Khorana (1996) does not find any conclusive evidence that underperforming managers take additional risk in the hope of offsetting accrued losses. Using contingency tables, Brown, Harlow and Starks (1996) find evidence supporting the tournament hypothesis but report conflicting results across sub-samples. Busse (2001) discusses methodological issues concerning the interpretation of contingency tables, and finds that results regarding the tournament hypothesis are very sensitive to the sample period chosen, the frequency of returns used to compute measures of risk, and the method used to compute standard errors. Goriaev, Nijman and Werker (2005) complement methodological issues raised by Busse. They also report that, depending in the sample period, the evidence in their sample as often supports the tournament hypothesis as it does the opposite result, namely, that poor half-year performers decrease the level of risk of their portfolio relative to that of strong half-year performers. Qiu (2003) and Kempf, Ruenzi and Thiele (2007) report similar evidence and suggest that it may be due to agency problems within mutual funds.
One important objective of this paper is to provide a unified and self-contained explanation to these seemingly contradictory results, without relying on unobserved agency problems within mutual funds. Our insight and central result is that incentives of fund managers arising from the flow-performance relationship vary sharply over time. We provide new evidence that small changes in economic activity can alter the convexity of the flow performance relationship in a way that is both statistically and economically significant. As found by previous researchers, the flowperformance relationship is convex on average. However, we find that convexity is most pronounced when economic activity is strong, while flows can even become a concave function of past performance during recessions. As convexity of investor flows drives the incentives for midyear underperformers to increase the risk of their portfolio, these incentives fluctuate along the business cycle. Not only can this observation explain why results from the existing literature appear to be quite sensitive to the choice of the sample period, but it also provides additional testable implications about when tests of the tournament hypothesis should work, and when they should not.
For our hypothesis to be valid, the change in risk by mid-year underperformers should be positively correlated with economic activity. We call this prediction the conditional tournament hypothesis.
The fact that economic activity changes the shape of the flow-performance relationship should not come as a surprise. First, we know that flows into mutual funds are strongly correlated with economic activity 3 : because of consumption smoothing, agents invest money into mutual funds when the economy is booming and divest when economic activity is slowing down. We also know that gross outflows are less sensitive to past performance than are gross inflows 4 . This may be because investors hold concentrated portfolios of risky assets, and are forced to liquidate their 3 See e.g. Kosowski (2006) 4 See evidence in Tables IV and V of Cashman et al. (2007) holdings, regardless of its performance, whenever they need to finance consumption 5 . It may also be because some investors suffer from a disposition effect, and hold on past losers while liquidating past winners 6 . However, no matter the reasons for the lower sensitivity of outflows to performance, the fact that outflows constitute a larger fraction of total flows when economic activity is weak than when it is strong implies that the flow-performance relationship becomes flatter throughout when economic growth slows down.
An alternative channel through which economic activity can affect the flow-performance relationship is volatility 7 . It is well-known that stock market volatility is countercyclical 8 . It is therefore reasonable to expect that any fixed level of performance by a mutual fund manager contains more "noise" during a recession than during a boom. If the flow-performance relationship is at least partially driven by investors trying to infer the skill of the mutual fund manager as a function of the manager's past performance, we should again expect flows to be less responsive to past performance when economic activity is weak than when it is strong.
Our analysis is based on actively managed US domestic equity funds appearing in the CRSP database between 1980 and 2006. We obtained three closely related sets of results. First, we investigate the impact of economic activity, as measured by US GDP growth, on the slope of the flow-performance relationship. We consider six specifications corresponding to six different measures of performance. In all specifications, GDP growth is found to have a statistically significant impact on the flow-performance relationship. The impact of economic activity on the convexity of the flow-performance relationship is strongest when performance is measured by a year-by-year ordinal ranking of fund managers, as in Sirri and Tufano (1998) or in Huang, Wei and Yan (2007) . Our point estimates suggest that the flow-performance relationship no longer exhibits any convexity as soon as GDP growth falls by 1% below its sample mean. Conversely, a GDP growth rate 1% above its sample mean implies a flow-performance relationship twice as convex as that found at the sample mean of GDP. In other words, we find that even moderate fluctuations in economic activity have a significant impact on the nature of incentives faced by mutual fund 5 The fact that investors typically invest in very few assets has been known at least since Blume and Friend (1975) . More recently, Calvet, Campbell and Sodini (2007) present new evidence from an extremely detailed database at the individual investor level which includes mutual fund holdings. They note that most investors do indeed hold very few assets in their risky portfolio (sometimes only one asset) but show that this does not necessarily result in significant under-diversification of the portfolio thanks to mutual fund holdings. 6 For the seminal paper on prospect theory which provides theoretical grounding for the disposition effect, see Kahneman and Tversky (1979) . For application and evidence to the stock market, see Shefrin and Statman (1985) or Odean (1998) 7 We are grateful to Laurent Calvet for pointing out this alternative hypothesis to us. 8 See e.g. Schwert (1989a and b), Hamilton and Lin (1996) or Mele (2007) managers. In line with this point estimate, we provide direct evidence showing that none of our results are driven by "abnormal years" corresponding to either deep recessions or strong booms.
Next, we evaluate the two possible channels through which economic activity may affect the flow-performance relationship: composition of aggregate flows and stock market volatility. In all specifications, we find strong evidence that years where aggregate flows into the mutual fund industry are large (and therefore gross outflows are small relative to gross inflows) are years with the strongest convexity in the flow-performance relationship. Although we find some evidence that higher stock market volatility leads to a lower sensitivity of flows to performance, we also find that stock market volatility does not explain the pattern of convexity of the flow-performance relationship across the business cycle.
Our final set of results deals with the conditional tournament hypothesis, that is the extent to which time variation in the shape of the flow-performance relationship directly translates into time variation in within-year changes in risk exposure as a function of mid-year performance. As in Koski and Pontiff (1999) , we consider three different measures of risk: total risk, defined as the standard deviation of the fund's return over the risk-free rate, idiosyncratic risk, defined as the standard deviation of residuals of a CAPM equation, and systematic risk, measured by the onefactor beta of the fund. In all three cases, we regress the change in risk exposure of the fund between the second and first halves of the year on mid-year performance and on an interaction variable equal to the product of GDP growth and mid-year performance. We find the strongest evidence in favor of the conditional tournament hypothesis when looking at the impact of mid-year performance on idiosyncratic risk. Regardless of the specification adopted, the coefficient of the interaction variable is statistically significant. In addition, point estimates of the regression suggest effects that are economically significant. For instance, in the case of a mild boom (GDP growth 1% above its sample mean), the change in risk exposure when going from bottom to top performer corresponds to around 30% to 40% of the risk of the average performer in our sample. Results of regressions where risk is measured by total risk are also consistent with the conditional tournament hypothesis. Coefficients remain of the right sign and with strong statistical significance. However, the effects are of smaller economic magnitude. The weakest results of all are obtained when looking at the impact of performance on systematic risk. This should however not come as a surprise as the reason why managers of underperforming funds may wish to change their risk exposure is so as to generate "spurious" alphas by the end of the year, which can only be achieved by changing idiosyncratic risk and not by changing the betas of their portfolios. Overall, our results thus suggest that choices of risk by fund managers are indeed consistent with the incentives provided to them by the flow-performance relationship.
This paper is quite closely related to work by Kosowski (2006) who studies the evolution of mutual fund performance and fund flows across the business cycle. Kosowski shows that the performance of mutual funds is negative on average but becomes positive during recessions. He also shows that aggregate flows are significantly larger during booms than during recessions 9 . Our focus here is different as we show that the flow-performance relationship is convex on average but may become concave during a recession, which is not implied by any of Kosowski's findings. We also show that the effect of economic activity on the shape of the flow-performance relationship arises under normal economic conditions, and is driven neither by deep recessions not by strong booms. Nonetheless, our results in the second half of the paper may instead cast a new light on Kosowski's results. Our results indicate that the divergence of the objectives of fund managers (who care about net flows) from the objectives of investors (who care about performance) is an increasing function of economic activity. A natural conjecture to make is that the distortion of incentives faced by fund managers may be partly responsible for the underperformance of mutual funds during expansion phases documented by Kosowski 10 .
Our work is also related to a recent working paper by Kempf, Ruenzi and Thiele (2007) who find that risk-shifting by mutual fund managers is correlated with market returns. Following on Qiu (2003), they argue informally that this correlation is due to the differential cost for a mutual fund manager to be fired under bad rather than good market conditions. However, they do not estimate this differential cost nor do they compare it with the high-powered incentives typically provided in the compensation package of mutual fund managers. Our paper differs from theirs in that we provide direct and new evidence of time variation in the incentives of fund managers arising from the convexity of investor flows rather than from career concerns of managers. We provide quantitative estimates of our effect and show that it is large enough to alter incentives of mutual fund managers in a significant fashion. We then relate the risk-shifting of fund managers in the second half of our paper to the exact incentives we identified in the first half.
Finally, the central result of our paper carries some methodological implications. The methodology most frequently used in the existing literature on the flow-performance relationship, Fama-MacBeth (1973) regressions, assumes that slope coefficients of all single-year regressions are drawn from the same distribution. In this paper, we provide evidence that the slope parameter, i.e.
the sensitivity of flows to performance, varies at business cycle frequencies, which contradicts the Fama-MacBeth assumptions and could lead to misleading conclusions, as first pointed out in the asset pricing literature, where evidence of time variation of betas at business cycle frequencies prompted the adoption of the conditional CAPM 11 .
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: in Section I, we describe the data, the variables, and the methodology we use in our analysis. In Section II, we report evidence on the time-varying nature of the flow-performance relationship and investigate the different channels through which economic activity may affect this relationship. Section III is devoted to the analysis of the conditional tournament hypothesis. Section IV concludes.
I) Data and Empirical Methodology

A) Data source
We use mutual funds that appear in the CRSP Survivor-Bias-Free US Mutual Fund Database between 1980 and 2006. As with most papers in the literature, we focus on US domestic equity mutual funds, and exclude fixed income funds, international equity funds and balanced funds, as well as any fund for which the proportion of stocks in the portfolio never exceeds 80%. As in Pastor and Stambaugh (2002), we exclude funds with front loads. We do this not only for the reason given by Pastor and Stambaugh (namely that it is not clear how to treat load fees in a single period setting) but mostly because of results obtained by Barber, Odean and Zheng (2005) which show that front loads have a stronger impact on the flow-performance relationship than any other fees. They also show that there have been substantial changes both in the proportion of funds with front loads (from over 90% in the 1940's to less than 40% in the 90's) and in the way investors react to front loads with investors learning to avoid funds with higher front-end loads. As our objective is to identify time-variation in the flow-performance relationship 12 due to the business cycle, we want to eliminate as much as possible any other source of time variation in our sample, thus our choice to 11 See e.g. Jagannathan and Wang (1996) 12 Brown, Harlow and Starks (1996) have shown that the presence of front loads also affects tests of the tournament hypothesis focus on no-load funds. Although several authors in the literature focus on percentage flows, obtained by dividing dollar flows by the previous year's TNA, we choose not to do so for two reasons. First, from a statistical standpoint, it is well-known that percentage flows contain many extreme outliers generally associated with small or new funds. Small changes to the procedure used to trim the sample or to winsorize the data seem to have large effects on the outcome of the regressions. Second, from an economic standpoint, we care about flows only to the extent that flows contribute to fees collected by the mutual fund and to the compensation package of the fund manager. Given the fee structure of mutual funds, where fees are a constant fraction of total net assets, we believe that dollar flows provide a better proxy for the true determinants of a fund manager's compensation package than do percentage flows. Put differently, it is unlikely that all other things being equal, a fund manager's compensation is a decreasing function of the fund's initial size, as would be the case if compensation was indexed on percentage flows.
Numerous different measures of performance have been used in the literature on the flowperformance relationship. In this paper, we use the three most commonly used measures, namely:
(i) Excess returns, defined as the return of the fund minus the return of the equally weighted market portfolio (ii) One factor alpha, defined as the residual of a CAPM equation, where the fund's beta has been estimated using the past 24 months of return data.
(iii) Four factor alpha, where the four factors are as proposed by Carhart (1997) , namely the return on the market portfolio, the SMB and HML factors of Fama and French (1993) , and a momentum factor, and where factor loadings of the fund have again been estimated using the past 24 months of return data.
These measures can be used directly, as in Gruber (1996) , Chevalier and Ellison (1997), Lynch and Musto (2003) , Barber, Odean and Zheng (2005) , among others. Alternatively, these measures can be used to rank funds within each year, and the ranks 13 used as a measure of performance, as in Sirri and Tufano (1998), and Huang, Wei and Yan (2007) , among others. We use both types of measures of performance in the paper, using the terminology "absolute performance" to refer to the first type and "relative performance" or "rank" to refer to the second type. We therefore have six different measures of performance, three of which are measures of absolute performance and three of which are measures of relative performance.
We use two types of control variables: we use cross-sectional variables of funds' characteristics that have been found by the existing literature to have an impact on flows from investors. We also use time-series variables, which we interact with performance variables so as to capture and interpret time-variation in the sensitivity of investor flows to past performance. Cross-sectional variables include expenses expressed in percentage, the age of the fund in years, and the fund's 13 The ranks within each year are normalized to lie between 0 and 1.
initial relative size, which is defined as and show that the presence of autocorrelation in daily returns makes the choice between daily and monthly returns non-trivial. However, Goriaev, Nijman and Werker conclude that "tests of the tournament hypothesis based on monthly data are more robust to autocorrelation effects than tests based on daily data". This motivates our choice.
C) Estimation Technique
As far as the flow-performance relationship is concerned, the most common procedure followed by the existing literature is to use Fama-MacBeth regressions. This would however be inappropriate for our purposes, for two reasons. First, Fama-MacBeth regressions consist in running separate regressions for each year and to treat differences in estimated slopes across different years in the sample as noise, based on which standard errors are computed. Our objective is to show that the true value of the slopes is time-varying and is driven by business cycle variables, which makes
Fama-MacBeth impossible to use. In addition, it is unlikely that our set of control variables is sufficient to capture all of the effects of fixed funds' characteristics on investor flows, which require us to adjust the computation of standard errors beyond that suggested by Fama and MacBeth.
We run an unbalanced panel, allowing for time fixed effects via a full set of year dummy variables (whose coefficients are unreported in the tables). In addition, we control for fund-specific effects by using standard errors clustered by funds. As a robustness check, we ran the same regressions using White standard errors and obtained t-statistics quite substantially larger than the ones obtained with fund clustering. As pointed out by Petersen (2007) , the difference in t-statistics between the two methods is strongly suggestive of fund specific effects left unexplained by the control variables. As a consequence, all p-values reported in the paper are based on the more conservative cluster standard errors. We use the same methodology of unbalanced panel data analysis with time fixed effects and clustering of standard errors by funds for the tournament regressions in Section III, for which we know from the analysis of Busse (2001) and Goriaev, Nijman and Werker (2005) that correlation of standard errors is a serious problem.
II) The Time-Varying Convexity of the Flow-Performance Relationship
A) Identifying the business cycle effect
Our primary objective in this section is to show that the sensitivity of investor flows to past performance changes in a systematic way along the business cycle. We first establish the facts and explore their robustness to various definitions of performance. We then investigate possible explanations of this phenomenon.
Our main results regarding the flow-performance relationship are in Tables II and III. Table II uses measures of relative performance while Table III (1), (3) and (5) show the standard flow-performance relationship as identified by the existing literature, with performance (either relative or absolute) measured by excess returns, 1-factor alpha and 4-factor alphas respectively. Regressions (2), (4) and (6) measure the time-varying flow-performance relationship, with the sensitivity of flows to past performance allowed to vary with the business cycle. Regressions (2), (4) and (6) are similar to regressions (1), (3) and (5) except that regressions (2), (4) and (6) contain an additional interaction variable, constructed as the product of performance with deviations of GDP growth from its sample mean.
The advantage of testing for the impact of economic activity using an interaction variable rather than simply splitting the sample between, say NBER recession years and other years is that it allows us to detect both effects occurring during normal years and effects driven by exceptional years of severe economic slowdown. This specification also provides a direct estimate of the magnitude of the impact of economic activity on the sensitivity of flows to past performance.
Using the chain rule, we can decompose the total effect of a change in performance on investor flows in the following way:
(
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The interpretation of (1) is straightforward. The coefficients in multivariate regressions are interpretable as partial derivatives. The first term in the RHS of (1) is equal to the coefficient of performance in a regression of flows on past performance and other control variables. Similarly, the partial derivative in the second term of the RHS is given by the coefficient on the interaction variable previously defined. Under average economic activity, that is, when the growth rate of GDP is equal to its sample mean, the second term in the RHS of (1) is equal to 0. In that case, the total effect of past performance on flows is just given by the partial derivative of flows on performance.
This implies that one can interpret the coefficient of flows on past performance as the sensitivity of flows to performance under average economic activity. On the other hand, when economic activity is strong (resp. weak), that is when the growth rate of GDP is larger (resp. lower) than its sample mean, the total effect of past performance on flows is equal to the partial derivative of flows on past performance plus a term of the same sign (resp. of the opposite sign) as the coefficient of flows on the interaction variable. This allows us to make the following statement which underlies the interpretation of all regressions in this section:
The sensitivity of flows to past performance is an increasing function of economic activity if and only if the coefficient on the interaction variable is positive
A standard feature of regressions in Tables II and III is that they separate out observations with "good" performance and observations with "bad" performance and allow the sensitivity of flows to past performance to differ depending on whether the past performance falls in the "good" or in the "bad" category. Defining the thresholds of regions of "good" vs. "bad" performance is in many ways an ad-hoc decision left to the econometrician. In the existing literature, papers that use relative performance use either three or five different quintiles while papers using absolute performance often divide performance into only two regions corresponding to positive vs. negative returns 14 . We follow the procedure used in the existing literature and use different partitions for relative and absolute performances even though it implies that results in our Tables II and III are not immediately comparable to one another.
More specifically, we follow the same procedure as Sirri and Tufano (1998) for Table II and partition relative performance into three unbalanced quintiles. We allow the sensitivity of flows to past performance (rank) to depend on whether the fund's performance in the past year ranked in the bottom quintile, the top quintile, or in between. In other words, the relationship between flow and past rank takes the form of a piecewise linear function. As in Sirri and Tufano (1998), we restrict this piecewise linear relationship to be continuous. Technically, this is achieved by defining:
Other specifications include using a semi-parametric approach as in Chevalier and Ellison (1997) or adding the square of performance as an additional independent variable as in Barber, Odean and Zheng (2005). The coefficient 1 a measures the sensitivity of flows to past good performance, and 3 a measures the sensitivity of flows to past bad performance. This is the specification of regressions (1), (3), and (5) in Table II .
To allow 1 a , 2 a , and 3 a to change with the level of economic activity, we adopt the following specification, used in regressions (2), (4) and (6):
For the absolute return regressions in Table III , we follow the same procedure as Lynch and
Musto (2003) and others, and simply partition (absolute) performance into two regions. A fund i is allocated to the positive (resp. negative) region during year t if its absolute performance in year 1 t − is positive (resp. negative), in which case the dummy variable δ + (resp. δ − ) takes value 1 for that fund and that year
As in the existing literature, we say that the flow-performance relationship exhibits convexity if and only if flows are more sensitive to good than to bad performances. Given the partitions of performance defined above, we obtain convexity for regressions (1), (3) and (5) in Table II if and only if the coefficient on the variable δ TOP is strictly larger than the coefficient on the variable δ BOTTOM . Similarly, we obtain convexity for regressions (1), (3) and (5) in Table III if and only if the coefficient on the variable Performance*δ + is strictly larger than the coefficient on the variable Performance*δ − . For all the specifications, we perform a one-sided t-test of the sign of the difference of the two coefficients and report the result in the tables immediately below coefficients of performance variables.
As far as regressions (2), (4), (6) in both tables, we can perform with convexity the same decomposition analysis as we did with the sensitivity to performance. Convexity of the flowperformance relationship can be decomposed into convexity under average economic activity, which obtains when the coefficient of performance in the good region is strictly larger than the coefficient of performance in the bad region, and the impact of economic activity on convexity.
Using equation (1) and the same reasoning as previously, we get that:
With relative performance, convexity of the flow-performance relationship is an increasing function of economic activity if and only if the coefficient of
GDP GDP (g -g ) * TOP δ is strictly larger than the coefficient of GDP GDP (g -g ) * BOTTOM δ
With absolute performance, convexity of the flow-performance relationship is an increasing function of economic activity if and only if the coefficient of Performance*
In either case, the result of the corresponding one-sided t-test is included in the tables immediately below the coefficients of the interaction variables.
[
INSERT TABLE II AROUND HERE]
Looking at the results of Table II , we first observe that fund characteristics explain investor flows in the usual way: larger and younger funds attract more dollar flows. As found by Barber, Odean and Zheng (2005), expenses do not seem to play a huge role once we exclude front loads.
We also see that the sensitivity of flows to past performance fits the pattern that has been observed by the existing literature: regardless of whether the ranking of funds is done on the basis of excess returns, 1-factor alpha or 4-factor alphas, we find that investor flows react positively and significantly to relative performance if the fund belongs to the top or to the middle quintile but do not react to relative performance if the fund belongs to the bottom quintile. As a consequence, tests of convexity under average economic activity yield p-values around 0.01 to 0.02 if funds are ranked according to excess returns or 1-factor alpha, and p-values around 0.05 to 0.06 if funds are ranked according to 4-factor alphas.
However, the most important result in Table II concerns the impact of economic activity, measured by GDP growth, on the sensitivity of flows to performance and on the convexity of the flow-performance relationship. Observing the coefficient 4 a , we observe that investor flows react more to performance of funds in the top quintile during years with strong economic activity. The effect is statistically significant at the 5% level of confidence when the ranking of funds is done according to excess returns and 1-factor alphas. It is also economically significant. If one compares the respective size of the coefficients 1 a and 4 a , one observes that the sizes are almost identical.
Using equation (1) and recalling that , ( )
is expressed in percentage, we can conclude that a +1% change in GDP growth induces a sensitivity of flows to performance in the top quintile which is twice as large as the average sensitivity of flows to performance. Similarly, a -1% change in GDP growth implies that investor flows become completely insensitive to performance. As the standard deviation of GDP growth in our sample is equal to 1.7%, our point estimates imply that even small fluctuations of economic activity can have a large impact on the sensitivity of flows to performance.
The same conclusion can be reached when looking at the impact of economic activity on the convexity of the flow-performance relationship. We find a strong statistical impact, with p-values ranging from 1.4% to 5.2%. We also find strong economic significance with again a +1% or -1% change in GDP growth implying, respectively, either twice as much convexity as the average convexity in the sample, or no convexity at all.
Results in Table III , using absolute returns instead of relative returns, are somewhat weaker.
When performance is based on 1-factor alphas (regressions 3 and 4), results are qualitatively similar to results in Table II : the flow-performance relationship exhibits convexity on average and the impact of GDP on convexity is both statistically and economically significant. When performance is computed with excess returns or with 4-factor alphas, we still get a significant positive effect of GDP growth on the sensitivity of flows to performance at the 5% level of confidence. We also get point estimates suggesting that faster GDP growth leads to more convexity. However, the effect on convexity is no longer statistically significant.
The relatively weaker results for absolute returns prompt us to investigate in more detail the business cycle effect before looking at possible implications on the incentives of fund managers, both in order to understand where the effect may originate from and whether it is or not a robust feature of the flow-performance relationship.
B) Sources of the business cycle effect
Before understanding why economic activity may have an impact on the convexity of the flowperformance relationship, we need to understand why convexity arises in the first place. The key premise is that investors look for funds delivering positive alphas. We know from the recent literature that, once one properly accounts for the luck factor, at best only a small fraction of mutual funds deliver positive alphas 15 . Thus, it is optimal for investors to invest primarily only in the very best performers in the industry. Berk and Green (2004) have demonstrated that performance chasing behaviour of investors and a convex flow-performance relationship may arise as the outcome of a competitive equilibrium model even if mutual fund performance is not persistent, as suggested by the empirical literature.
While this argument applies to both new investment flows and portfolio rebalancing flows, it is unlikely to apply for outflows. Indeed, we observe empirically that investors invest only in very few assets 16 . As a consequence, investors are forced to liquidate whichever asset they invested into, regardless of its performance, whenever they need to finance consumption. The relationship between outflows and performance could even go in a counter-intuitive way if at least some investors suffer from a disposition effect whereby they hold on past losers and liquidate past winners, as has been demonstrated for the stock market by Shefrin and Statman (1985) and by Odean (1998) . In fact, evidence to that effect is provided in Tables IV and V of Cashman et al. (2007) where it appears that outflows are much less sensitive to performance than inflows.
In our dataset, we observe neither inflows nor outflows but net flows which is the sum of the two. If inflows are a convex function of performance but outflows are not, net flows will themselves be a convex function of performance if the relative weight of inflows relative to outflows is large enough. Because of consumption smoothing, it is natural to expect that the relative proportion of inflows vs. outflows to be correlated with economic activity. been provided by Kosowski (2006) and the result holds in our dataset as well. This provides a first possible channel through which economic activity may affect the convexity of the flowperformance relationship: stronger economic activity implies relatively more inflows than outflows.
An alternative explanation starts from the well-known observation that stock market volatility is countercyclical 17 . High volatility increases the "luck factor" in the realized performance of fund managers and thereby complicates the inference process of investors. As the inference process becomes more noisy, we should again expect flows to be less responsive to past performance when economic activity is weak than when it is strong.
In order to disentangle these two effects, we run a "horse race" between the flow composition effect and the countercyclical volatility effect. Instead of interacting performance with GDP growth, we interact it instead with average flows of the year, Tables IV and V. [
INSERT TABLES IV AND V AROUND HERE]
The most striking feature of the regressions in Tables IV and V is the strong support they provide to the average flow channel. For all six specifications, we find that the sensitivity of investor flows to past performance is a sharply increasing function of t AFLOW for funds in the top performance region. Looking for instance at the first regression in Table IV and comparing the   relative size of coefficients 1 a and 4 a , we find that a one standard deviation increase of t AFLOW leads to a slope which is three times as steep as under average market conditions. This effect is statistically significant in all six specifications. In contrast, t AFLOW has no discernable impact on the sensitivity of flows to performance for funds in the middle or bottom performance regions.
Thus, an increase of t AFLOW always implies a stronger convexity of the flow-performance relationship. Looking at the results in Table IV , we find that the effect is always statistically significant at the 5% level and that it is economically significant as well: a one standard deviation increase in t AFLOW leads to a flow-performance relationship which is three times more convex than under average normal conditions.
Looking now at Table V , we see that the same results supporting the conditional tournament hypothesis and the flow composition channel carry through with absolute returns. This is in contrast with results we obtained in the previous sub-section where the evidence in favour of a business cycle effect on the flow-performance relationship was weaker with absolute than with relative returns. A possible explanation for this finding is provided by the coefficients of the interaction variable between performance and stock market volatility. We find that, when significant, higher stock market volatility implies a lower sensitivity of flows to performance. However, we also find that this effect never affects the top performance region. That is, higher stock market volatility never leads to less convexity. On the contrary, when stock market volatility is high, that is during recessions, investors tend to "forgive" fund managers who obtained disastrous absolute performance, while the same performance in an environment with low stock market volatility would cause investor outflows. This effect goes in the opposite direction from the flow composition channel, thus leading to the more ambiguous overall effect of GDP growth on convexity for the absolute return case.
As the effect of high stock market volatility is likely to be concentrated in a few abnormal years, we now investigate whether the business cycle effect arises as an outcome of normal economic conditions or whether it is driven by a few outliers corresponding to either deep recessions or strong booms.
C) Normal fluctuations of economic activity vs. extreme fluctuations Our last robustness checks consist in checking whether the property that a change in economic activity implies a change in the convexity of the flow-performance relationship holds in a sample where we remove all years which experienced large economic fluctuations, either downward (recessions) or upwards (strong booms). Mean GDP growth in our sample is equal to 2.9%.
Standard deviation is equal to 1.7%. We use somewhat arbitrarily chosen cut-offs for our reduced sample of deviations of GDP growth around the sample mean equal to plus or minus 2%. In other words, we retain in our reduced sample all years during which GDP growth lies in the interval [+0.9%, +4.9%]. This requirement excludes 5 of the 27 years initially in our sample, namely 1980, 1982, 1984, 1991 and 2001 . We then test the effect of GDP growth on convexity in our reduced sample and report the results in Tables VI and VII   [INSERT TABLES VI AND VII AROUND HERE] Comparing results obtained for the reduced sample in Tables VI and VII with results obtained for the full sample in Tables II and III These findings show that economic activity has an impact on the shape of the flow-performance relationship above and beyond any effect driven by "abnormal" years with strong negative or positive growth. As such, they complement and reinforce conclusions reached by Kosowski (2006) on the impact of real activity on performance and flows using NBER recessions. They also suggest that the relationship which associates investor flows to relative performance is more stable than the relationship which associates investor flows to absolute performance, in that investors seem to interpret absolute performance differently in years with strong economic fluctuations and/or high stock market volatility than they do under normal conditions. Finally, our finding that small variations of economic activity cause significant variation in the sensitivity of flows to past performance contradicts the assumptions of the methodology most frequently used in the existing literature on the flow-performance relationship, namely Fama-MacBeth (1973) regressions, which requires slope coefficients of all single-year regressions to be drawn from the same distribution.
Using the Fama-MacBeth methodology when the slope coefficient is time-varying can lead to misleading conclusions, as first pointed out in the asset pricing literature on the conditional CAPM 18 .
Summarizing the results in Section II, we find that:
(i) Convexity of the flow-performance relationship varies with economic activity.
(ii) The effect of economic activity on convexity is economically significant: a +1% change in GDP growth implies a flow-performance relationship which twice as convex as on average (iii) The effect of economic activity on convexity is driven by a flow composition effect: the stronger the economic activity, the more inflows relative to outflows, and the more sensitive net flows are to (good) performance.
(iv) The effect of economic activity on convexity arises under normal economic conditions and is not driven by years with extreme fluctuations.
III) Application: Solving the Tournament Puzzle
A) Conditional vs. Unconditional Tournament Hypothesis
Having established that the shape of the flow-performance relationship varies with economic activity, we now turn to its implications for the incentives of fund managers. The fact that a convex flow-performance relationship may induce fund managers who underperform during the first part of the year to increase the risk of their portfolio has been well-known since the seminal papers of Brown, Harlow and Starks (1996) and Chevalier and Ellison (1997) . The model underlying this conjecture is both simple and appealing given institutional characteristics of the mutual fund industry. We know that the fee structure in the mutual fund industry is such that fees received by funds are maximized when net flows and total net assets are maximized. We also know that the evidence strongly suggests that investor flows are a weakly increasing function of performance with a flat section in the region of worse performance, which makes them (as first pointed out by Brown, Harlow and Starks) like payoffs of a tournament. Then, a simple computation implies that increasing risk for funds currently in the region where flows are insensitive to performance is a "free gamble": either performance falls even deeper in the region of worse performance, but this affects neither flows nor fees, or performance jumps up sufficiently to enter the region with positive slope, in which case both flows and fees go up.
As discussed in the introduction, however, recent empirical evidence has been less supportive of This implies that the theoretical prediction of the tournament hypothesis is ambiguous.
Our view in this paper is more optimistic. We use the results we obtained in the previous section showing that incentives provided by the tournament structure of flows changes with the level of economic activity in a significant fashion. When economic activity is strong, there is strong convexity of the flow-performance relationship, thus the difference between the "prize" available to "winners" of the tournament and the payoff of the "losers" is large, and the incentives for "underdogs" to increase the risk of their portfolio in the middle of the tournament are strong. In contrast, when economic activity is weak, the prize for winning the tournament is small and incentives for poor mid-year performers to undertake risk-shifting are much less. In fact, point estimates of the flow-performance regressions in the previous section suggest that the flow-performance relationship becomes concave when economic activity slows down enough, which would actually reverse the incentives provided to managers of funds with poor mid-year performance. In other words, our argument is that the time-varying nature of the flow-performance relationship implies that the appropriate tournament hypothesis to test is that poor mid-year performers should increase the risk of their portfolio if and only if economic activity is strong. We call this hypothesis the conditional tournament hypothesis, in contrast with the (unconditional) tournament hypothesis tested by the existing literature which implies that poor mid-year performers should always increase the risk of their portfolio.
Three remarks need to be made about the conditional tournament hypothesis:
(i) It does not solely constitute a way to justify why tests of the unconditional tournament hypothesis may fail or may give different results across sub-samples. It also provides strong testable implications about when the tournament hypothesis will hold and when it will not: the change in risk by poor mid-year performers should be positively and significantly correlated with economic activity.
(ii) The conditional hypothesis does not suffer from the same problem of theoretical ambiguity as the unconditional hypothesis. It is unlikely that the cost for a manager to be fired is lower in a recession than in an expansion phase. Qiu (2003) and Kempf, Ruenzi and Thiele (2007) Risk ∆ on the performance of fund i during the January-June period of year t (mid-year performance) using unbalanced panel data techniques allowing for fixed year effects through a full set of year dummy variables and using standard errors clustered by funds to allow for fund-specific effects.
Regressions (2), (4) and (6) augment the set of independent variables to allow for economic activity to interact with past performance, and thus test the conditional tournament hypothesis.
Regressions (2), (4) and (6) can be interpreted the same way as we interpreted the time-varying flow-performance relationship regressions. Using the chain rule, we have:
, , , As in Section II, the first term in the RHS of (1) is equal to the coefficient of mid-year performance. Similarly, the partial derivative in the second term of the RHS is provided by the coefficient on the interaction variable between GDP growth and mid-year performance. We can again interpret the coefficient of mid-year performance as the sensitivity of
to mid-year performance under average economic activity. The prediction of the unconditional tournament hypothesis is that this coefficient should be negative: the lowest the mid-year performance, the more the fund manager should increase the risk of his portfolio.
However, when the economic activity is strong (resp. weak), that is when the growth rate of GDP is larger (resp. lower) than its sample mean, the total effect of mid-year performance on by construction always between 0 and 1, with 0 corresponding to the worse performer and 1 to the best performer. Remember also that GDP growth is expressed in percentage. The coefficients of the interaction variable in Regressions (4) in Tables VIII to X then imply that the impact of a 1% increase in GDP growth is a difference in terms of (monthly) idiosyncratic risk between bottom and top performers equal going from 0.73% to 0.95%. To put these numbers in perspectives, we can compare them to the average level of idiosyncratic risk for funds in our sample, which is slightly above 2%. Our point estimates thus imply that during a mild expansion, the bottom performer in our sample shifts the level of idiosyncratic risk in his portfolio relative to that of the top performer by a factor between 1.3 and 1.4, which is not huge but is nevertheless economically significant 20 .
Results regarding the conditional tournament hypothesis for total risk (Regressions 2) are still fairly strong in terms of statistical significance: the interaction variable is always of the right sign, it is significant at the 0.01 level of confidence in three out of six specifications of the measure of performance, and it is significant at the 0.05 level of confidence in all specifications. Economic significance is however more modest than for idiosyncratic risk: doing similar computations as above yields that during a mild expansion, the bottom performer in our sample shifts the level of total risk in his portfolio relative to that of the top performer by a factor between 1.07 and 1.25.
Given the decomposition of total risk in between systematic and idiosyncratic risk and given the results above, it should come as no surprise that our weakest results hold for systematic risk.
Actually, if one looks at statistical significance only, the conditional tournament hypothesis seems to hold for systematic risk as well: the coefficient of the interaction variable is again negative and significant in 5 out 6 specifications. However, performing the same test of economic significance as above reveals that the effect of mid-year performance on the change in beta by fund managers is trivial in terms of magnitude. For instance, point estimates of regression (6) in Table VI suggest that the bottom performer increases the beta of his portfolio relative to that of the top performer by an amount equal to 0.07.
To summarize our results, we find strong statistical support for the conditional tournament hypothesis in all specifications of the tournament regressions. In terms of economic significance, the strongest effect is found when looking at idiosyncratic risk. This should not come as a surprise.
The reason why managers of poorly performing funds want to increase the risk of their portfolio is in the hope of being lucky and to generate "spurious alphas", so as to fool investors into believing that the manager possesses high skill. This can only be done by raising idiosyncratic risk. Thus, to get back to the issue that initially motivated the literature on the tournament hypothesis, our results strongly suggest that mutual fund managers do respond to incentives provided to them by the (timevarying) flow-performance relationship
IV Concluding Remarks
In the past few years, there has been formidable growth in the literature on investor flows in the mutual fund industry, and on the tournament hypothesis. We believe that this paper provides an important link that bridges many of the results in the existing literature that have so far remained unconnected. This missing link is the fact that the convexity of the flow-performance relationship varies strongly with economic activity. Our point estimates suggest that a plus or minus 1% variation in GDP growth entails respectively, twice as much convexity as average, or no convexity whatsoever. Our finding provides a quantitatively plausible solution to different issues in the mutual fund literature such as:
(i) Why there is significant time variation in the extent of risk-shifting by mutual fund managers, as in Brown, Harlow and Starks (1996) (ii) Why mutual funds seem to deliver worse performance during booms than during recessions, as in Kosowski (2006) (iii) How different qualitative properties of gross inflows and gross outflows, as identified by
Cashman et al. (2007), affect fund managers decisions
More generally, our results point toward a complex two-sided interaction between real activity and incentives of market participants. Asset pricing theory has long recognized that time-varying risk premia and shocks to risk aversion are central for our understanding of asset prices. In a very modest way, this paper provides a very specific channel through which shocks to economic activity translate into shocks to the risk appetite of agents. We leave it to future research to discover if this channel, or channels like it, can contribute quantitatively to our understanding of time-varying risk premia. , where TNA i,t represents the total net assets of fund i at the end of year t (in M$) and where r i,t is the net return of fund i during year t. Each year, funds are ranked between 0 (poorest performer) and 1 (best performer) based on their previous year performance, where performance is either measured by excess return r i,t-1 -r m,t-1 , where r m is the return on the equally weighted market portfolio, or by residuals of a CAPM equation (1-factor alpha) 
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